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Police Terror and Officer Indemnification
ALLYSSA VILLANUEVA*

Introduction
On May 6, 2012, Oakland Police Officers Miguel Masso and
Joseph Fesmire initiated a stop of Alan Bluford and two friends in
Oakland, CA.1 The facts are disputed but the altercation escalated
resulting in Bluford sustaining three fatal gunshot wounds from
Officer Masso.2 Bluford was an 18-year-old high school senior.3 No
weapons were found on Bluford and witnesses stated he was not a
threat to anyone around.4 In July of 2012, Bluford’s mother filed suit
in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her
son’s civil rights against the Oakland Police Department and the
individual officers involved.5 In June of 2014, the case settled with an
award agreement in the amount of $110,000 to Bluford’s family and
was approved by the Oakland City Council.6
These homicides are portrayed as aberrations from routine
* J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law,
2016. Thank you to U.C. Hastings Professor Osagie Obasogie and to the Hastings Race
and Poverty Law Journal.
1. Bluford v. City of Oakland, No. 12-CV-0379-WHO, 2014 WL939939, at *1
*N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015).
2. Id.
3. Alan Bluford FAQ, JUSTICE4ALANBLUEFORD.ORG (Nov. 12, 2012), http://justice4
alanblueford.org/2012/11/12/alan-blueford-faq/.
4. Id.
5. Complaint for Damages for Violations of Civil Rights and Wrongful Death,
Bluford v. City of Oakland, No. C12-03791 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2012).
6. Family of Teen Killed by Oakland Police Receives $110k Settlement, ABC 7 NEWS
(June 4, 2014), http://abc7news.com/news/family-of-teen-killed-by-oakland-policereceives-$110k-settlement/94178/.
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policing and as rare “accidents.”7 However, this atomized focus
on each single event transforms them into a spectacle and it is the
job of the spectacular to draw attention away from the banality of
police murder as standard operating procedure. 8
The
9
spectacularized event of murder by police is actually routine. Police
power is unique because it is the government’s central grant of
authority to use physical repression and violence against citizens.10
This includes implied power over life and death.11 Police actions must
be reviewed because a unique aspect of their power is the ability to
use lethal force against unarmed citizens.12 Even if there were no
demonstrable pattern of police malpractice, the experience of
American history suggests that safeguards must be constructed
against any grant of state power as large as that given to the police.13
Critical Race Theory (“CRT”) was founded as a critique of the
law as an institution complicit in the creation and sustenance of
racism, discrimination, and other forms of societal inequality. 14
This Note offers a critique of indemnification law specifically, and
§ 1983 generally, as the main civil cause of action for homicides
committed by police in the line of duty. Furthermore, CRT
provides an analytical framework to assess the current economy of

7. Steve Martinot & Jared Sexton, The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy, 9 SOCIAL
IDENTITIES: J. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE, NATION, & CULTURE 2, 6 (2003).
8. Id.
9. Reported data shows that officers have killed 600-800 people every year in the
past decade, which suggests a routine, if not daily, occurrence. ANDREA M. BURCH,
2003-2009 Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ARREST-RELATED DEATHS 4 at
T1 (2011).
10. Government police power is the general power to infringe on individual
liberty to serve the public welfare. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962).
11. ZENITH GROSS, POLICE POWER AND CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR AN
INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD 4 (ACLU ed., 1966); Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15
PUBLIC CULTURE 11, 11 (Translated by Libby Mientjes, 2003).
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 14.
14. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiiixiv (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995).
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police violence, its historical trajectory, and legal structuring
through a racial lens.
Before attending law school, I completed an undergraduate
honors thesis entitled “Police Terror and Anti-Black Genocide in the
United States.”15 That thesis examined the issue of officer-involved
homicides through a Black Studies and Ethnic Studies framework.
The scope of this Note is limited to lethal police violence as it becomes
subject to § 1983 litigation through a Critical Race Theory lens. The
Note focuses specifically on § 1983 civil suits and the doctrine of
indemnification; it will not include any discussion of potential
criminal liability or nonlethal forms of police use of force.
Often, the only direct consequences for officers comes internally
from their department or the locality they serve.16 These commonly
include: paid administrative leave, work suspension, negative reports
in their file, job transfer, and other disciplinary measures. Many civil
rights laws rely heavily on the assumption that police officers pay
judgments and settlements out of their own pockets.17 However, most
officers do not.18 The court’s jurisprudence prohibiting municipal
liability for punitive damages was designed to protect taxpayers from
bearing the costs of officer misconduct.19 However, recent studies
reveal that taxpayers almost always satisfy both compensatory and
punitive damage awards assessed against their sworn servants.20 This
cost shifting effectively undercuts any liability potentially imposed on
15. Allyssa Villanueva, Police Terror and Anti-Black Genocide in the United
States (June 13, 2012) (unpublished B.A. honors thesis, U.C. San Diego) (on file with
the Ethnic Studies Department, U.C. San Diego).
16. There is no comprehensive tracking of discipline and punishment rates of
officers who use excessive force. This is due in part to the lack of mandated reporting
and to the fact that many aspects of personnel decisions are not available for public
disclosure. For officers’ thoughts and experiences with discipline, see DAVID
WEISBURD ET AL., THE POLICE FOUNDATION, “THE ABUSE OF POLICE AUTHORITY:
NATIONAL STUDY OF POLICE OFFICERS’ ATTITUDES” loc. 31 (2001) (online report) http://
www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Weisburd-et-al.-2001-TheAbuse-of-Police-Authority.pdf.
17. Joanna Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 887 (2014).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 888.
20. Id. at 890.
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an individual officer through court judgment.
To address this practice, which fails to serve the goal of
deterrence of lethal police misconduct, I propose excluding public
monetary awards resulting from officer-involved homicides from
indemnification coverage so that officers will bear sole responsibility.
Individual liability is a necessary component in the regime of police
reform to increase officer accountability and to decrease the number
of officer-involved homicides of unarmed civilians each year.
I will first discuss the current problems of lethal police violence.
I then discuss the doctrine of indemnification. I will then center my
discussion on civil suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and how the
doctrine of indemnification, as applied, undermines the goals of the
statute as well as the goal of deterring lethal police violence, which is
my primary concern. I conclude by proposing my own solutions
directed at local governments.

I. Overview of the Problem of Officer-Involved
Homicides in the United States
A central hurdle to defining the problem of officer-involved
homicides is the lack of national and uniform reporting requirements.
Departments currently participate in federal reporting programs on a
voluntary basis.21 Therefore, no one knows exactly how many people
die each year at the hands of law enforcement. Reporting mandates
are a key component to federal police reform.22
The United States (U.S.) Department of Justice publishes reports
on arrest-related deaths nation-wide.23 In the Department’s most
recent report of data from 2003 to 2009, homicide by law enforcement
was the leading cause of arrest-related death and increased by eight
21. Reporting mandates may accompany consent decrees resulting from
Department of Justice investigations of unconstitutional “pattern and practices.” 42
U.S.C. § 14141 (1994).
22. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, INTERIM REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 8 (2015).
23. BURCH, supra note 9, at Fig. 1.
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percent over the course of the reporting period.24 Regardless of the
manner of death, 4,813 people died in the course of arrest during this
period.25 Local governments are uniquely positioned to address this
problem as 73.3 percent of arrest-related deaths reported to the federal
government from 2003-2009 involved local police departments.26
A. Officer-Involved Homicides Are a Manifestation of
Racism.
Nationally, communities have organized protests, educational
events, media blackouts, and occupations to demonstrate their
dissatisfaction with officer-involved homicides and the lack of
remedies, consequences, or meaningful reform. 27 The existing data
also support the public’s charges of racial inequality in arrest and
arrest-related deaths.28 The existence of racial category in the federal
government’s reports presupposes a racial dynamic in the tactic of
police lethal violence.29 Racism is the ordinary means through which
dehumanization achieves ideological normality and it is through the
practice of dehumanizing people that produces a racial category.30
Regardless of intent, our national policing structure results in the
disproportionate victimization and risk of death to civilians based
on race.
24. Id.
25. BURCH, supra note 9, at T1.
26. Id. at T17.
27. See, e.g., Kenrya Rankin Naasel, RECAP: From #BlackLivesMatter to
#RiseUpOctober, a Day of Protest, COLORLINES (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:51 PM) http://
www.colorlines.com/articles/recap-blacklivesmatter-riseupoctober-day-protest;
David Nakamura & Hamil Harris, 20 Years After the Million Man March, a Fresh Call
for Justice on the Mall, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/20-years-after-the-million-man-march-a-fresh-call-for-justice-on-the-mall/
2015/10/10/b3d8ffca-6f66-11e5-b31c-d80d62b53e28_story.html.
28. BURCH, supra note 9, at T3 (disaggregating statistics by racial categories,
including “White, non-Hispanic;” “Black non-Hispanic,” “Hispanic,” “Other,”
“Unknown”).
29. Id.
30. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, AND OPPOSITION IN
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 243 (2007).
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Overall, 27.8 percent of all arrests were Black people yet thirtyone percent of the reported deaths related to arrest were Black
victims.31 Between 2003 and 2009, 1,529 Black victims were killed during
arrests, which amounts to about one Black person per day, giving rise to
the popularized slogan that a Black person is killed every twenty-eight
hours by state or local law enforcement personnel in the U.S.32 During
the time period of this study, the national Black population was
reportedly under thirteen percent.33 Every historical study of police use
of fatal force has found that persons of color (principally Black males) are
a disproportionately high percentage of the persons shot by police
compared to their representation in the general population.34 If the
number of Black people killed annually by law enforcement personnel is
not alarming enough, consider the total number of victims, irrespective
of race and/or gender.35 Black people are more likely to be killed by
police now than they were fifty years ago.36

31. BURCH, supra note 9, at T3.
32. BURCH, supra note 9.
33. JESSE MCKINNON, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000, 1 (2001). It is also important
to note that California is the leading state in arrest-related deaths, with 775 total
reported deaths over the six-year period. See BURCH, supra note 9.
34. Hubert G. Locke, The Color of Law and the Issue of Color: Race and the Abuse of
Police Power, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF
FORCE 129, 135 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
35. Citizen-generated databases estimated that 1,029 people were killed by law
enforcement in 2014. See Jay Syrmopoulus, Citizen Run Database Show over 1,000 People
Killed by Cops in 2014, FREE THOUGHT PROJECT (Dec. 10, 2014), http://thefreethought
project.com/data-shows-1000-people-killed-cops-2014/. The last report released by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics totaled 4,813 deaths in custody or during attempted
arrests from 2003-2009. See More than 4,800 Arrest-Related Deaths Reported from 2003 to
2009, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Nov. 17, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/press/ard0309stpr.cfm.
36. Recent data estimates that police killed 238 Black people in 2014. See Tony
Ortega, Black Americans Killed by Police in 2014 Outnumbered Those Who Died on 9/11,
RAW STORY (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/2015/04/blackamericans-killed-by-police-in-2014-outnumbered-those-who-died-on-911/.
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B. Racism Manifested in Officer-Involved Homicides is
Historical.
Although heightened attention to systemic police violence is
recent, the practice is historical. Gerald Robin’s study remarked that
throughout several past sociological studies, “Regardless of the index
used, then, the Negro’s tendency to be a subject of police slayings is
excessive [noting that] for a nation as a whole the ratio of Negro to
white rates of the victim-offender was 7 to 1, respectively.”37 A study
conducted in Philadelphia from 1950 to 1960 found that 87.5 percent
of the victims of homicides by police were Black while the current
population of the city was only twenty-two percent Black.38
In a subsequent study produced in 1974, research determined that
the death rate for Blacks was found to be consistently nine times higher
than for whites for the entire period of 1950-1968 in his study of police
killings of “unarmed” civilians.39 This study suggested that the rise in
Black victims of homicide by police is attributable to the rise in Black
militancy and political struggle during the time period.40 One year
later, an article on police killings in the U.S. from 1965 to 1969 based
on the National Vital Statistics systems report combined this previous
data and determined that Black people were killed by the police at a
rate thirteen times higher than for whites and not the nine to ten times
previously reported.41 The report also offered details that thirty
percent of the civilians killed from 1965 to 1969 were not involved in
criminal activity. This is confirmed by a report released by the Police
Foundation, which reveals that as many as forty percent of civilians
killed by the police were not involved in serious criminal conduct.42
These studies provide evidence of a history of racist and anti-Black
37. Gerald Robin, Justifiable Homicide by Police Officers, 54 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 223, 226 (Summer 1963).
38. Id. at 2.
39. Sid Harring, Tony Platt, Richard Speiglman & Paul Takagi, The Management
of Police Killings, 8 CRIME & SOC. JUSTICE 34, 34 (1977).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 36.
42. Id. at 39. The Police Foundation’s mission is to advance policing through
innovation and science. Id.
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policing practices in the U.S. The ratio has increased between Black
and white victims even while the Black American population has
declined.43
C. Officers Enjoy a Unique Level of Impunity.
The police continue to kill civilians. Officer impunity adds insult
to injury. Though officer-involved homicides are a daily occurrence,
criminal prosecutions of police officers for misconduct in the line of
duty are exceedingly rare.44 Police officers have been indicted in every
region of the U.S. for acting under the color of law, unlawfully
shooting the victim, and taking away his or her constitutional right
not to be deprived of life and liberty without due process of law.
However, federal indictments do not mean that justice has been
obtained because all too often the police officers involved are found
not guilty. From 2009 to 2011, 2,716 officers throughout the U.S. faced
allegations of excessive force.45 Of those 2,716 officers, only twentyeight were charged with a crime and fourteen were convicted which
is only a 0.5 percent conviction rate.46 As evidence of historical trend,
180 out of 228 officers indicted by the federal government between
1971 and 1975 were acquitted.47
These data reveal a continued pattern of protection and
justification for officers who kill. Impunity itself is troubling but
becomes intolerable when data and other evidence indicate that
43. The Black U.S. population was 13.2 percent in 2012. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
THE BLACK ALONE POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012 (May 2, 2015),
http://www.census.gov/population/race/data/ppl-ba12.html. The same year, there
were 313 reported extrajudicial killings of Black people, amounting to one Black
person killed every twenty-eight hours. ARLENE EISEN, OPERATION GHETTO STORM:
2012 ANNUAL REPORT ON EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OF 313 BLACK PEOPLE BY POLICE,
SECURITY GUARDS AND VIGILANTES 12 (2014), http://www.operationghettostorm.org/
uploads/1/9/1/1/19110795/new_all_14_11_04.pdf.
44. Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 152 (1998).
45. David Packman, The Problem with Prosecuting Police in Washington State,
NAT’L POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT (Feb. 21, 2011, 12:55 AM), http://www.
policemisconduct.net/the-problem-with-prosecuting-police-in-washington-state/.
46. Id.
47. Harring et al., supra note 39, at 40.
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officer-involved homicides are also informed by systemic racism.48
Though they occur at different times and places, these homicides are
similar to the extent that they are premised on the logic of anti-Black
racism.49
Furthermore, victims cannot defer to the existing structure of
criminal justice when the alleged perpetrator of illegal behavior is an
officer of the law. Even though police officers are employees of the
local or state government, victims’ families must turn to these same
structures to seek justice. This triggers distrust in the legal system,
which is exacerbated when there are seemingly no consequences for
officers who are responsible for the death of an unarmed civilian.
These notions of the state as the arbiter of justice and the police as the
unaccountable arbiters of lethal violence are two sides of the same
coin.50

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its Application to Local and
State Governments and Individual Police Officers
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the most commonly used civil cause of action
to remedy homicides caused by police officers, therefore, it follows
that indemnification also occurs in cases alleging unconstitutional
conduct under § 1983 against law enforcement personnel.51
Indemnification protects police officers from individual liability for
monetary judgments entered against them and ensures that a
prevailing plaintiff can collect their court-ordered judgment.52

48. Locke, supra note 34, at 137. Hubert Locke’s research on race and police
violence concludes that officers are more likely to use reasonable force against Blacks
which increases the likelihood that such officers will adopt an aggressive or hostile
approach to Black suspects but not white suspects.
49. Villanueva, supra note 15, at 40.
50. Martinot & Sexton, supra note 7, at 2.
51. Martin Schwartz, Should Juries be Informed that Municipality Will Indemnify
Officer’s § 1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1211
(2001).
52. Id.
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The Court’s jurisprudence of § 1983 has developed as tort law.53
Therefore, tort principles determine available remedies, which
include compensatory, punitive, and exemplary damages.
Compensatory damages are strictly provided to compensate the
prevailing party for the injury suffered, thus these awards must
correlate with the actual harm to the aggrieved party.54 On the
contrary, punitive damages are awarded as retribution and
deterrence of the offending party’s unlawful actions.55 Smith v. Wade
held that the threshold showing for awarding punitive damages in §
1983 cases requires that defendants be motivated by “evil motive or
intent” or show “reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of others.”56 The amounts awarded for punitive
damages are left to the discretion of the jury or fact finder.57
Exemplary damages are awarded when a defendant’s behavior
results from an “evil state of mind” including recklessness or spite.58
Exemplary damages differ from punitive awards in that they may also
serve compensatory functions.59
States and municipalities throughout the country frequently
indemnify police officers to protect them from personal liability for
monetary awards. States such as California mandate that public
entities defend their employees in suit and pay any “judgments,
compromises, or settlements agreed to in the process.”60 A 2014 study
found that approximately 9,225 civil rights cases were resolved with
payments to plaintiffs between 2006 and 2011 in the forty-four largest
police jurisdictions in the country.61 Of those cases, officers financially
contributed to settlements or judgments in approximately 0.41

53. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983).
54. James R. Mckown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and Developments, 14 REV.
LITIG. 419, 422–23 (1995).
55. Id.
56. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56.
57. Id. at 54.
58. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 517 (1957).
59. Id. at 520–21.
60. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a) (1995).
61. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 912–13.
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percent of the cases and only 0.02 percent of the total dollars paid.62
Furthermore, no officer paid any portion of a punitive damage award
assessed against him or her.63 A subsequent study of police
misconduct suits confirmed that no City of Oakland police officer has
paid settlement costs in civil rights-related cases since 1990.64 The
information collected further evinces that the largest police
departments in the country each paid, on average, upwards of $20
million in settlements from 2006 to 2010.65 Indemnification shifts
these costs from the individual officers and their respective police
departments to cities and their resident taxpayers. Indemnification
thus operates to make citizens, including the victims, pay the costs of
lethal police misconduct.
Municipalities are specifically subject to § 1983 suits whereas the
Eleventh Amendment gives states immunity against such suits and
any resulting damages.66 Municipalities often indemnify officers for
compensatory damages under § 1983. State indemnification statutes
regarding punitive and exemplary damages commonly require that
the employee must (1) have acted within the scope of employment, (2)
not have engaged in intentional, reckless, or malicious wrongdoing,
and (3) be in the best interest of the public entity. 67 All three factors
are weighed under the “sole discretion” of the government or public
entity.68
Municipalities, specifically, are immune from being assessed
punitive damages in § 1983 suits.69 However, Smith held that officers
may be sued in their individual capacity and assessed punitive

62. Id.
63. Id. at 916.
64. Abraham Hyatt, Oakland Spent $74 Million Settling 417 Police Brutality
Lawsuits, OAKLAND POLICE BEAT (Apr. 9, 2014), http://oaklandpolicebeat.com/2014/04/
oakland-spent-74-million-settling-417-police-brutality-lawsuits/; JOHN L. BURRIS,
BLUE VS. BLACK: LET’S END THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COPS AND MINORITIES 22–23 (1999).
65. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 912–13.
66. Id. at 1214; U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
67. Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1217; see, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b).
68. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b).
69. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
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damages.70 In practice, municipalities pay the cost of punitive
damages. However, the threshold findings required to award
punitive damages should make an officer ineligible for
indemnification. A municipality’s obligation to indemnify an officer
for punitive damages does not make the municipality the real party
in interest, and thus does not violate the holding in Newport71 that
municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983.72
This precedent leaves municipalities responsible for damage awards
that may rest primarily on punishment of the officer and not on
compensation for the plaintiff. Furthermore, evidence that the
municipality may indemnify the defendant is not admissible at trial.73
In general, federal courts exclude this information from the jury just
as liability insurance is excluded in tort cases.74 State courts have not
resolved whether a jury should be informed of this fact.75
The two prominent justifications in favor of officer
indemnification are (1) that officers will be deterred from performing
their jobs and (2) indemnification ensures that the plaintiff will be
made whole. To the first claim, there is no factual basis to assert that
law enforcement will be chilled if officers are not indemnified since
no municipality has implemented a reform to deny indemnification
of their officers in lawsuits for lethal use of force against unarmed
civilians. Though this may be a legitimate concern, studies show that
officers rarely pay any out-of-pocket costs for their defense or to
satisfy awards assessed against them.76 Many states require
governments to provide officers with legal representation to defend
claims arising from conduct or omission within the scope of officers’
employment, regardless of whether the department ultimately

70. Smith, 461 U.S. at 35.
71. Newport, 453 U.S. at 271.
72. Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1220; see also Cornwell v. Riverside, 896 F.2d 398
(1990); Bell v. Milwaukee, 536 F. Supp. 462 (1982).
73. Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1220.
74. Id. at 1229–30.
75. Id. at 1212.
76. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 890.
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indemnifies the officer.77 Available evidence indicates that law
enforcement officers are almost always provided with defense
counsel paid by municipalities when they are sued. 78 Finally,
refusing to perform one’s job without indemnification presupposes
conduct that warrants litigation. This is a reasonable expectation for
law enforcement occupations. However, it becomes unreasonable to
expect indemnification in the context of litigation regarding conduct
that rises to the level of evil that warrants punitive damages.
The second justification that plaintiffs will not be made whole is
the most compelling. Yet even this justification is not wholly merited,
for at least two reasons. First, a plaintiff who has lost a relative due to
an officer-involved homicide can never be made truly “whole” in the
tortious sense, or be put back into the same position they were in
before the incident, because the victim is deceased. On this ground,
the tort of wrongful death is more egregious than lesser degrees of
injury cognizable under tort law yet offers the same remedies.
Second, police are government agents, funded through public dollars,
and controlled by local and state governments. The public should all
be uncomfortable allowing state agents whose primary mission is to
“protect and serve” and enforce the law to commit arguably the most
heinous crime—homicide—with no direct personal or financial
liability.
The California Supreme Court addressed both arguments in its 1976
holding, in Williams v. Horvath, that state indemnification applies to
officer defendants in § 1983 federal suits.79 The court expressly rejected
the argument that indemnification deprives plaintiffs of their rights to
full relief, because this would mean that governments are never liable for
their employees’ conduct, and would actually limit plaintiffs’ recovery.80
The Court comments, “[I]t may be argued that to permit indemnification
would remove an effective deterrent to illegal police conduct—the
potential of personal liability. But in truly egregious cases the
77. Id; see, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 825(a) (1995).
78. Id. at 915. Officer defendants are usually represented by a city attorney or
county counsel.
79. 16 Cal.3d. 834, 836 (1976).
80. Id. at 845.
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indemnification statutes expressly forbid reimbursement by the
entity.”81 Government indemnification or constructive indemnification
by police unions and foundations show the opposite of this theory: near
complete indemnification no matter the alleged conduct or judgment.
Local governments assume entire liability for defense and fulfillment of
awards with no responsibility resting on the individual officer whose
conduct is the impetus of the suit.

III. The Legislative and Judicial History of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and its Application
42 U.S.C. § 1983 makes it unlawful for any person, under color of
law, to deprive any citizen of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the U.S. Constitution and federal and state law.82 Section
1983 does not confer substantive rights to potential plaintiffs, but
creates a cause of action to vindicate rights found either in the U.S.
Constitution or federal statute.83 Section 1983 was originally enacted
as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” to provide a remedy for civil rights
violations inflicted by anyone acting “under the color of law.”84
Section 1983 was passed in response to voluminous reports of Ku
Klux Klan (“KKK”) violence and the inability of local governments to
address it.85 Nonenforcement of the law on the state and local level
was the main problem identified by Congress at the time of the Act’s
passage.86 The Act was passed with the larger purpose of ensuring
that lower governments would enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Congressman Lowe of Kansas
expressed at the time that:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while
81. Id. at 848.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
83. Id.
84. Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Act Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13) (also referred
to as “Enforcement Act of 1871,” “Third enforcement Act,” or “Third Klu Klux Klan
Act”).
85. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).
86. Id.
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whippings, lynching and banishing have been visited
upon unoffending American citizens, the local
administrators have been found inadequate or unwilling
to apply the proper corrective measures. Combinations,
darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies,
wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone
unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime and the
records of public tribunals are searched in vain for any
evidence of effective redress.87
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the specific
question of whether police officers are equally subject to § 1983 suits
in Monroe v. Pape.88 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that thirteen
Chicago police officers broke into their home without a search or
arrest warrant, made all the residents stand naked in their living
room, ransacked their belongings, detained Plaintiff Monroe for
questioning for ten hours without access to an attorney, then released
Monroe with no charges.89 The Court held that acting “under color
of” the law is interpreted as a misuse of power, possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law.90 Since the Monroe decision held that
police are certainly subject to suits under this provision, § 1983 suits
have increased.91
Subsequently, Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of
New York, addressed whether a municipality can be the subject of suit
under § 1983.92 The Monell Court overruled the portion of Monroe that
held that local governments are completely immune from suit under
§ 1983.93 The Court held that local governments and officials can be

87. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., 374 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe) (quoted
in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985)).
88. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174.
89. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
90. Id. at 184.
91. Sheldon H. Nahmad, Personal Viewpoint: The Mounting Attack on Section 1983
and the 14th Amendment, 67 A.B.A. J. 1575, 1586 (1981).
92. 436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978).
93. Id. at 658.
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sued directly under § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations as a
result of an official policy or custom which results in a “pattern or
practice” of misconduct.94
Indemnification creates a liability
relationship that mirrors the tort concept of respondeat superior
between municipalities and its officers.95 Respondeat superior imposes
vicarious liability on an employer because of the conduct or omission
of its employee.96 However, the Supreme Court held in Monell that
vicarious liability through respondeat superior is inapplicable to § 1983
suits.97
The original 1871 Act also included provisions for harsher
punishment when the underlying charge is a criminal offense
including larger fines and extended prison sentences.98 In United
States v. Harris, the Court interpreted these provisions when the State
brought criminal conspiracy charges against Tennessee Sherriff, R. G.
Harris, and nineteen others who removed four men from a county jail
and subsequently beat one man to death.99 The Court held that the
criminal provisions were unconstitutional because Congress did not
have constitutional authority to regulate private individuals.100 Harris
was only recently overturned in United States v. Beebe.101 In Beebe, the
defendants were indicted under the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of
2009 for conspiracy to commit a federal hate crime and the racially
motivated harassment and assault of a developmentally disabled
Navajo minor.102 The Court held that Congress did have authority to
enact the criminal provisions under the power granted by the
Thirteenth Amendment and that racially motivated violence is a
badge and incident of slavery.103 Section 1983 was enacted to

94. Id. at 659.
95. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 889.
96. 51 A.L.R. Fed. 285 § 2(a) (1981).
97. Monell, 436 U.S. at 707.
98. Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Act Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13).
99. U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 629–31 (1883).
100. Id. at 640–42.
101. 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (2011).
102. Id. at 1047; see also 18 U.S.C. § 249 (Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009).
103. Beebe, 807 F. Supp 2d at 1051 & 1056.
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counteract domestic terrorism and nonenforcement of the law, often
perpetrated by the same person: law enforcement officers.
Indemnification, especially in the blanket application we see today,
undercuts the purpose of § 1983 by circumventing direct liability and
denying citizens full protection from violence by those “acting under
color of law.”104

IV. Circumvention of the Original Purpose of § 1983
Through Officer Indemnification
Our nation has declared racism a problem of the police force
itself, embedded in police policies and in individual officer
discretion.105 If police are racist, and racism manifests itself in lethal
police misconduct, officer indemnification is, in effect, the symbolic
sanctioning of these attitudes and practices. Officer-involved
homicides are an auxiliary constituent of the carceral state, a revised
practice of lynching with many of the same tenets linking racism,
criminalization, and domestic terrorism.106
A.

Officers Involved in Lethal Misconduct Do Not Face
Legal Consequences.

As this Note has described, officer-involved homicides
contribute to our society’s long legacy of state terror and oppression.
Furthermore, the legal recourse for this violence is inadequate.
Criminal prosecution of officers is exceedingly rare, and the few that
are charged rarely result in conviction.107 Civil suits are often the only
way to impose legal liability on officers following a homicide. The
104. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174 (discussing the purpose and history of Section 1983
to redress civil rights violations by law enforcement or failure to enforce the law by
local law enforcement).
105. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 22.
106. Terrorism defined as the use of violence and intimidation in pursuit of
political aims.
107. Allyssa Villanueva, Police Terror and Prosecutorial Discretion, (UC
Hastings College of the Law, working paper, 2015) (on file with author) (providing
an overview of problems in criminal prosecution of officers and suggested solutions
for local governments).
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main justification for indemnification is its supposed benefit to
plaintiffs by ensuring that the liability of insolvent officers will shift
to municipalities whom are able to pay monetary awards.108
However, this reduces the legitimate substantive claims of
constitutional violations resulting in death to a mere discussion of
money. Indemnification contributes to the banality of police terror
when it has the power to curtail this practice. Indemnification, as
applied, shields officer defendants and does nothing to shield citizens
from the violence that gives rise to § 1983 suits. This injustice is
exacerbated by the low rates of criminal prosecution of officers who
are found to have unlawfully used lethal or excessive force against
unarmed civilians who posed no threat to them while in the line of
duty. Local government involvement to assist with monetary
remedies diminishes the significance of the violation and the injury to
the plaintiffs that often includes racism and unjust lethal violence by
government agents.
B. The Current Application of Indemnification to § 1983 Suits
Does Not Serve the Goal of Deterrence.
The prospect and accumulation of civil suits, unfortunately, may
not be enough to actually deter officers or encourage governments to
implement policies that will have such a deterrent effect. A recent
study found that the six police departments, constituting thirty-two
percent of officers in the largest police departments across the
country, do not gather or analyze information from lawsuits against
them or their officers in any comprehensive or systematic way.109 This
information could be used for preventative and remedial measures
including: early identification of problematic officers with a history of

108. See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 847 (1976) (holding that
indemnification does not frustrate purpose of § 1983 but rather furthers the purpose
by ensuring that Plaintiffs can recover from Defendants and that municipalities can
be liable).
109. Joanna Schwartz, Myth & Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law
Enforcement Decision-making, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1045 (2010).
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misconduct or complaints, identification of patterns & trends, and
investigation of claims made in lawsuits.
Furthermore, individuals charged under § 1983, who are not
officers of the law, do not have the benefit of an agency to indemnify
their awards. Such defendants must bear the total brunt of the
liability. Indemnification creates a more favorable outcome for officer
defendants compared to civilian defendants for the same violation.
This “privilege” available to officer defendants is unsettling because
officers are currently subject to § 1983 more frequently than
civilians.110 Blanket indemnification results in no legal accountability,
criminal or civil, to individual officers engaged in misconduct. There
are countless examples of officers, chiefs, and other officials who have
revealed deep-seated racist beliefs and attitudes.111
C. The Current Law Enforcement Regime is Directly
Connected to a Legacy of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S.
The KKK is arguably the most well-known domestic terrorist
organization in the U.S.112 The KKK was directly responsible for the
systematic perpetration of centuries of racialized domestic terror,
inflicted upon African Americans, in particular.113 Reports estimate
that countless police departments across the country actively
participated in at least fifty percent of documented lynchings in the
U.S. between 1880 and 1950, and passively condoned a majority of the
rest.114 An important and ironic dynamic of this history of statesponsored violence is the commonly known fact that many KKK

110. Nahmad, supra note 91.
111. See, e.g., Associated Press, 7 San Francisco Officers Suspended over Racist Texts,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/03/cops-racist-text-sus
pend_n_7001580.html (Apr. 4, 2015, 8:59 AM).
112. Extremist Files: Ku Klux Klan, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.
splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan (last visited Oct. 17,
2015).
113. Id.
114. Robert A. Gibson, The Negro Holocaust: Lynching and Race Riots in the United
States, 1800-1950, YALE NEW HAVEN TEACHERS INST. (2015), http://www.yale.
edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1979/2/79.02.04.x.html.
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members and participants in these high-profile, coordinated, and
widely celebrated acts of terrorism were in fact, distinguished
members of the law enforcement community. Officers were routinely
complicit in refusing to charge known KKK terrorists, to vindicate its
victims, and allowing mobs and terror groups to forcefully take
victims from police custody. Concerned citizens and hate-tracking
organizations, like the Southern Poverty Law Center, have discovered
officers belonging to the KKK or other hate groups that conflict with
the mission of police departments.115 Most police departments do not
currently screen officers for hate group affiliation.116 These facts
intensify the demand for equal policing that is free of racism and
discrimination.
For a nation-state like the U.S., sovereignty means the capacity to
define who matters and who dies.117 In a local context, police are
given that power of discretion. Licensed by law, the mere capacity of
the police for vicious and “irrational” violence is an important part of
the state’s repressive apparatus, regardless of statistical frequency.118
The willingness of the police to kill people exerts a control power far
beyond any statistical measure of the actual incidence of police
killings.119 Even with statistical measure, victims are unequal along
racial lines.

V. Proposed Reform at the Local Government Level to
Deter Lethal Use of Force
The objectives of this proposed reform are deterrence and
115. Allie Jones, This Florida Police Department Can’t Stop Hiring KKK Members,
GAWKER (July 14, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://gawker.com/two-alleged-kkk-members-firedfrom-florida-police-depar-1604795204.
116. Renee Lewis, No Police Screening for KKK, Hate Group Membership, Florida
Case Shows, AL JAZEERA (July 15, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://america.aljazeera.
com/articles/2014/7/14/kkk-florida-police.html.
117. Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUB. CULTURE 11, 11 (Translated by Libby
Mientjes, 2003).
118. Harring, et al., supra note 39, at 42.
119. Id.
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punishment. At the least, municipal governments should not
indemnify punitive awards based on officer misconduct, because the
awards are based solely on findings of egregious misconduct and
imposed for the purpose of punishment, not compensation. Complete
non-indemnification of officers in any suit resulting from lethal
misconduct (as opposed to nonlethal) is needed from employing
agencies to deter lethal use of force policies and practice. A strict policy
will force officers to not just think about the potential of civil suit but
also the possibility of personal liability for monetary awards.
Prosecutorial discretion and internal investigations following
officer-involved homicides demonstrate an unwillingness to
criminally charge officers causing current national controversy. As
discussed in Part IV, arguments that without indemnification people
will not become officers or that officers cannot perform their jobs are
unpersuasive. Furthermore, direct personal liability for civil awards
puts an extreme financial burden on the officer(s) based on the fact
that awards can reach millions of dollars. It is unlikely that officers
will bear the burden alone. Police culture has created an ironclad
system of moral, political, and financial support from police unions,
foundations, and the larger American public. 120 Many of these
organizations use their power to fund attorneys and support
campaigns for officers. The National Police Misconduct Statistics and
Reporting Project estimates that civil litigation related to police
misconduct cost $72 billion in 2009 alone.121 Simple exposure to civil
liability requires minimal reform effort with a potential for high
societal impact. Local governments should not be in the business of
indemnifying punitive awards by definition of the degree of conduct
required to warrant punitive damages.
Furthermore, local
governments can use their statutory discretion to refuse to indemnify
120. See, e.g., online fundraising campaigns for Officer Darren Wilson who was
acquitted by a jury at trial for death of 18-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson,
Missouri; Carolyn M. Brown, Over $500,000 in Crowd Funding Raised for Ferguson Officer
Darren Wilson, BLACK ENTER. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.blackenterprise.com/news/
over-500000-raised-for-ferguson-officer-darren-wilson-before-sites-shut-down/.
121. National Police Misconduct Statistics and Reporting Project, 2009 Quarterly Q2
Report, CATO INST., http://www.policemisconduct.net/statistics/quarterly-q2-2009/
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
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officers in the specific class of cases involving the use of lethal force.
In the narrow case of officer-involved homicides, civil law
reduces the violation to a mere tort that seeks to compensate victims
and their families, rather than punish or deter the defendant. This
effectively devalues citizens’ lives; a value that is not even paid by the
officer(s) responsible. Personal liability will strengthen deterrence.
Deterrence is furthered by the threat of contempt of court proceedings
if an officer refuses to pay a civil award. While state laws differ,
contempt of court generally refers to the disobedience of any lawful
judgment or order of the court.122 The penalties for contempt of court
vary and may include: jail time, community service, fines, and
attorney fees.123 Direct liability for civil damages may lead to other
punitive measures if officers fail to take responsibility under court
order.
When police and their supporters feel the true weight of the
millions of dollars that are assessed in damages and settlements each
year against municipalities for lethal officer misconduct, they might
re-consider their position on the issue. Officers will certainly
consider whether their discretion to use lethal force in the field is
worth the risk to their personal finances with knowledge that their
City will not indemnify them in suit. This shift of thinking from “Can
I use lethal force?” to “Should I use lethal force?” will save countless
lives. Cities will also have more money available to fund any number
of other critical expenditures. It is true that non-indemnification will
leave some successful plaintiffs without payment or delayed
payment. Arguments for liability that turn on compensation shift the
focus away from the structural issue of officer-involved homicides to
monetary awards and a party’s ability to pay. Individual victim
compensation does not address the structural problems of policing
that this Note intends to address.
Indemnification effectively circumvents individual liability that
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to impose. Victims are left without the
122. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1209(a); La. Code of Civ. Proc. § 221 et seq.;
N.Y. Code § 2308; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571–81.
123. 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 5 (2015).
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legal right to life and liberty, and their families are left without an
institution to provide them with justice. The law, clothed in the ethic
of impunity, is simply contingent on the repetition of its own
violence.124 The least that local governments can do to remedy the
historical trajectory of racist and anti-Black state violence is not
indemnify its officers in cases involving homicide, especially when a
court finds the officer’s misconduct is as egregious or evil as to meet
the higher standard required for punitive damages.
Each officer should be held individually liable for such civil
awards. States such as California grant sole discretion to the public
agency of whether to fulfill punitive or exemplary damages.125
Furthermore, all states have an exemption for memorandum of
understandings (“MOUs”).126 The terms of an MOU are bargained
for between the police union and the municipality. These are a few
of the opportunities for municipalities to limit their liability to satisfy
awards based on officer misconduct.

Conclusion
American society does not yet function as an idyllic state in
which all vestiges of racism, oppression, and malicious deprivation
of constitutional rights have been eliminated.127 When police kill, the
shock of the violence and the weight of the resulting awards are
absorbed by local governments and their taxpayers. However, it is
the local governments who are generally empowered to impose
direct consequences on their officers and best situated to address the
problems raised in this Note.
The individual officers who are the perpetrators of lethal
violence and defendants in subsequent suits face no personal stake in
the current regime of civil legal remedies. Criminal liability is even
more of a rarity imposed on individual officers. Racism exists at the
individual, interpersonal, and structural levels of society. No form

124.
125.
126.
127.

Martinot & Sexton, supra note 7, at 8.
See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 825(b) (1995).
See supra Part I.C. for an in-depth discussion of officer impunity.
Williams, 16 Cal. 3d at 841.
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of jurisprudence, civil or criminal, has been successful in imposing
individual accountability for the citizen’s life prematurely ended by
police violence. Current remedies and suggested policy reforms are
consistently structural. Reform must be instated at every level and
indemnification limitations must be aimed at the individual and
interpersonal level of this systemic violence.

